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Abstract  The Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands (BSAI) red king crab fisheries
are managed with a controversial, market-based policy design, in which both in-
dividual transferable fishing and processing quotas are used. Despite the fact
that the policy design maintains contestable markets, concern remains that the
use of individual transferable processing quota (IPQ) damages harvesters who
receive individual transferable fishing quota (IFQ). An integer, nonlinear opti-
mization model that incorporates an empirically estimated, non-linear catch per
unit effort function is developed to measure imputed IFQ values. The imputed
quota values are based solely on harvesting efficiency in the absence of IPQs or
potential wealth redistribution between sectors. Results are compared to a pre-
rationalization optimization model and also to empirical quota trading prices in
the presence of IPQs. This with and without analysis lends insight into whether
and/or the extent to which IPQs damaged BSAI crab harvesters.
Key words  Crab rationalization, IPQ, IFQ, imputed quota prices, harvesting ef-
ficiency.
JEL Classification Codes  Q22, Q28, D61, C61, L78.
Introduction
The most controversial fishery policy in the U.S.A., and possibly the world, was
implemented fall 2005 in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands (BSAI) crab fisheries
off western Alaska (Benton 2002). The cornerstones of the BSAI crab rationalization
design were the use of individual transferable processing quota (IPQ), along with indi-
vidual fishing quota (IFQ), and specific fishery-dependent community protections.
These policy design elements were intended to maintain contestable markets (Baumol
1982; Baumol, Panzar, and Willig 1982; and Bresnahan and Reiss 1991), while recog-
nizing prior economic interests and the importance of the partnership between
harvesters, processors, and ultimately, fishery-dependent communities (Duffy 2002).
Until recently, individual transferable quota policies recommended by econo-
mists allocated only IFQs to harvesters, despite consequential and unintended
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redistribution of processing sector wealth to harvesters (Lindner, Campbell, and
Bevin 1992; Matulich, Mittelhammer, and Reberte 1996; and Matulich and Sever
1999). Following years of intensive industry negotiations that settled on the so-
called “two-pie allocation” of IPQ and IFQ, the North Pacific Fishery Management
Council (Council) broadened the policy design to include specific community pro-
tection elements. On June 10, 2002, the Council unanimously passed a “three-pie
voluntary cooperative” policy that recognized the economic interests of all three
sectors, mindful of the tradeoffs between maximum efficiency and maximum effi-
ciency subject to various social goals. The Council motion was enacted into law
January 2004 (16 U.S.C.S. § 1862(j)(1), (2) (Supp. IV 2004)).
The policy design promised to increase economic returns and stability for har-
vesters, processors, and communities and to enhance overall efficiency by
encouraging voluntary industry cooperation, so each of the three partners look be-
yond simple self-interest to the synergistic benefits of mutual interests (Duffy 2002).
Nevertheless, the plan is not without a long list of critics. Some crab harvesters,
economists, individuals in state and federal fishery agencies, the U.S. Department of
Justice, members of Congress, fishermen from around the country, fishery conserva-
tion organizations, and even editors of major newspapers across the country reviled
the plan. A common theme among the critics is that IPQs increase antitrust risks and
will damage the economic welfare of harvesters.
Despite rhetoric that equated the crab rationalization policy with slavery (Young
2004 and Tillion undated), communism (McCain 2004), and Stalinism (Bromley
2005), the Council took a circumspect, wait-and-see view of this novel policy. The
Council required unprecedented socio-economic data collection from all quota re-
cipients; they also required an early, 18-month policy review, a three-year review,
and five-year review for the purpose of assessing whether the policy was achieving
its intended goals. Upon passing the policy, the Council notified industry and the
public that it would modify the policy if the Council’s intent/goals were not
achieved.
The research reported in this article was initiated at the request of the Commis-
sioner of the Alaska Department of Fish and Game, two years prior to plan
implementation. Commissioner Duffy recognized that the economic data would
likely provide scant empirical evidence for the early 18-month review and may not
be adequate for the three-year review. He asked that the research, which was initi-
ated prior to fall 2005 implementation, provide insight into expected rationalization
benefits and, in particular, address whether the use of IPQs has detrimental effects
on harvesters that the critics claimed were inevitable.
Economic performance of the Bristol Bay red king crab fishery is modeled with
and without rationalization. The analysis abstracts from the many detailed elements
of the policy, though still captures the expected efficiency benefits or losses to har-
vesters. Harvesters, for example, were allocated 100% of their qualified catch
history as IFQ, while processors received only 90% of their corresponding qualified
processing history as IPQ. Ninety percent of the catch has to be delivered to any
processor holding IPQ. The residual 10% IFQ allocated to harvesters has no delivery
restrictions; i.e., does not have to be delivered to a processor holding IPQ. This un-
balanced quota allocation between sectors was fiercely negotiated by harvesters as a
means to increase ex-vessel price leverage over processors who, some argued,
would derive market power from IPQs. The intended effect of the 90:10 split was to
allow both sectors and fishery-dependent communities to benefit from rationaliza-
tion, and to maintain opportunities for new entrants into processing (National
Marine Fisheries Service 2004). Formation of voluntary cooperatives, community
protection measures, binding arbitration, skipper shares, use caps, and inclusion of
community development quota are also omitted from the analysis.Processing Quota Impact on Crab Harvesters 255
None of these elements are essential to determine whether harvesters were dam-
aged from IPQs relative to the license-limited policy state. It is only necessary to
establish whether qualified harvesters (vessel owners) who were allocated IFQ in
the Bristol Bay red king crab fishery were better or worse off following plan imple-
mentation, absent any cross-sector redistribution—intended or otherwise. This goal
is achieved by measuring pure harvesting efficiency gains with and without rational-
ization at precisely the same ex-vessel price; i.e., by removing any possible
influence of IPQs from the analysis. Although the Council and Congress were silent
on the distribution of rationalization benefits between harvesters and processors,
providing both benefitted, the analysis lends insight into whether the policy design
might have skewed the benefits toward one sector or the other. To this end, a com-
parison of the equilibrium imputed quota price and the empirical market price of
quota indicates whether harvesters benefitted more or less than the pure efficiency
value of rationalization. No attempt is made to measure the impact of the program
on processors or communities, though all communities are assured their historic
share of landings and, thus, landings taxes.
Data and Methods
Optimal fishing behavior under license-limited access management is contrasted
with transferable quota management and attending fleet consolidation. Two integer,
nonlinear optimization models are constructed to evaluate policy-induced behavioral
changes. The license-limited access optimization model developed by Briand et al.
(2004) for the Bristol Bay red king crab fishery is extended to better reflect fleet
heterogeneity, updated cost of production data, and a revised objective function that
more accurately captures actual returns to individual vessels and the fleet. Rela-
tively little detail is presented for the license-limited access model because the
modifications required to accommodate these few changes were relatively minor. In-
terested readers should consult Briand et al. (2004) for a complete model
description. An overview of the transferable quota management model is presented
below, following introduction to the nonlinear catch per unit of effort (CPUE) func-
tion. Policy-induced behavioral changes are highlighted.
A centerpiece of both optimization models is a nonlinear CPUE function relating
the time a crab pot soaks (soak time) to CPUE. A generic representation of that logisti-
cal, von Bertalanffy-type function is CPUEV =  β β
0 1 2 () , − − e STV  where STV  is the vessel
specific soak time, β0 is the asymptotic catch, and β2 is the catch rate.1 The CPUE
function was empirically estimated from state and federal fishery time series data
for the Bristol Bay red king crab fishery and recalibrated to conditions reflecting the
2004 season. Conceptual and estimation details regarding this CPUE specification
are detailed in Briand, Matulich, and Mittelhammer (2001). Calibration is discussed
below.
1 The relationship between CPUE and soak time is extensively reviewed in Miller (1990). Collectively,
the literature provides evidence that CPUE (generally measured as total catch of crabs or fish per trap)
increases asymptotically with soak time due to a progressive reduction in both bait effectiveness and the
density of the species being fished. Additional factors found in the experiment-based literature to affect
the shape of the asymptotic CPUE-soak time relationship include: size and effectiveness of the gear
(e.g., Munro 1974); inter- and intra-species behavioral interactions (e.g., Miller 1979); local stock den-
sity (e.g., Sinoda and Kobayasi 1969); and general environmental conditions such as temperature, time
of day, and current (e.g., Bennett and Brown 1979). Zhou and Shirley (1997) found an asymptotic catch
model to be particularly appropriate to describe the CPUE-soak time relationship for short fishing sea-
sons, like red king crab. Ability to move gear during a rationalized fishery similarly avoids localized
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The 2004 fishery not only was the last license-limited access crab fishery, it had
the dubious distinction of being the quickest race-for-fish on record. A fleet consist-
ing of 243 catcher vessels (CVs) plus eight-catcher processors (CPs) harvested
13,889,067 pounds of red king crab, in just three days-eight hours. The CV fleet har-
vested 95.7% of the total catch.
Fleet heterogeneity is approximated in this study by disaggregating it into five-
vessel size classes (<100 feet, 100–109 feet, 110–125 feet, 126–139 feet, and >139
feet). Harvesters in each vessel class were surveyed prior to the 2004 season to ob-
tain cost of production data similar to the economic data collection required by the
policy. Thirty-eight mostly independent vessels participated in the survey to reflect
the behavior, catch, and cost structure across the heterogeneous fleet. Each vessel-
length class is assumed to consist of homogeneous, representative vessels, the
number of which conforms to the fleet structure in the year being modeled or the
policy scenario. All fleet data, including total catch-by-vessel-class and initial quota
allocations were compiled by the Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADF&G)
from confidential fish ticket files.2
Abbreviated Optimization Model
The rationalized fishery model integrates quota-trading elements of Matulich,
Mittelhammer, and Reberte (1996) and Matulich and Sever (1999) into a variant of
the license-limited access optimal fishing behavior model of Briand et al. (2004).
Like Briand et al., this optimization model is constructed in the context of a com-
plete description of the fishing process and the policy-induced incentives harvesters
have to adjust the fishing process.
Individual harvesters are assumed to adopt optimal fishing strategies. Optimum
amounts of gear and soak times that maximize quasi rents (revenues in excess of vari-
able costs) define the individual vessel catch for an expected or given season length.
Each harvester’s optimization problem is subject to a variety of constraints. A common
season length across all harvesters aggregates vessel-specific catch to fleet-wide catch.
Regardless of policy state, vessels retain a portion of the gross revenue after de-
ducting the crew’s share of operating expenses (fuel and bait costs, and in the case
of a rationalized fishery, the annual rental cost of acquired quota). Though crew pay-
ment practices differ somewhat across the fleet, the most common practice is that
the crew is paid a share of the gross revenues, net of bait and fuel expenses, and the
annual rental cost of acquired quota. Typically there is no deduction for the initial
quota allocated to the vessel. The vessel is responsible for paying a constant $25 per
crewday for food and P&I insurance costs, plus all variable pot costs, though this
practice also differs somewhat across the fleet. Some vessels, for example, require
crew to pay for all food so as to lessen food waste. Inactive vessels that rent their
initial quota allocation to another vessel earn quasi rents equal to the quota payment
they receive. A consolidated representation of the fleet-wide constrained optimiza-
tion problem is given in equation (1).
2 The initial quota allocations compiled by ADF&G may not be identical to the official allocations made
by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). However, any error should be small because the
NMFS official allocations were based on ADF&G fish ticket data.Processing Quota Impact on Crab Harvesters 257
Max QR




Vi Vi V V V V
V
,,, , , ′



































Vi Vi Vi V V





P Catch n m ST SL

























0 ωω ω ,.
The indices Vi denote the ith vessel in vessel-length class V; NV is the number of ves-
sels in class V; QRVi denotes quasi rents retained by the vessel; (1 – γV) denotes the
vessel share of revenues net of shared operating expenses; γV is the crew share;  P
denotes the ex-vessel price of crab, net of taxes and fees; CatchVi is the total harvest
by the vessel, which is derived from the CPUE function scaled by the number of
pots fished (nV) and the number of times they are picked (mV) during the fishing sea-
son of length (SLV); crew variable costs (CVCV) is the fuel and bait cost that is
shared by the crew and the vessel; vessel variable costs (VVCV) is the daily cost of
food, P&I insurance, and the variable pot costs, which are borne solely by the ves-
sel; ωVi is the initial quota allocation; ω′ Vi is the amount of quota bought (ω′ Vi > 0),
held (ω′ Vi = 0), or sold (ω′ Vi < 0); S is the equilibrium quota price defined by the unit
quasi rents (UQRs) earned by the marginal active and inactive vessels; and TAC is
the total allowable catch.
The shared fuel and bait cost is a function of the number of pots fished, the
number of times they are picked, and the vessel-specific elapsed time (TV). The
elapsed time is the sum of time spent in preseason activities (PreTV), the non-uni-
form rotation of fishing activities that are systematically updated to define the
optimal season length (SLV), and post-season activities (PostTV). Systematic linkage
of time-dependent activities is explained in the next subsection. VVCV is a function
of the number of pots fished and the elapsed time, TV.
Conceptually, the model is constructed around two clocks. The first clock accu-
mulates time within the fishing season, SLV, as catch accumulates, and the second
clock accumulates time from the beginning of preseason activities and ends with
completion of all post-season activities, TV, as operating costs accumulate. Note that
the vessel-specific season length is determined by the soak times of the pots fished,
as well as the choices of nV and mV.
The final term in the objective function is the cost/revenue from quota trading,
following current industry convention. The crew pays a share (γV) of annual quota
cost (Sω′ V) on all rented quota at the time of delivery, like bait and fuel expenses, so
that active vessels pay sω′ Vi = (1 – γV)Sω′ Vi, ω′ Vi > 0 on rented quota. Exiting vesselsMatulich 258
retain the full value of quota that is rented to another vessel (sω′ Vi = Sω′ Vi, ω′ Vi > 0).3
Optimal quota holding behavior of profit maximizing firms is given by:
if ,  then
acquire  quota 











































The term –sω′ Vi is removed (along with the last constraint) when modeling the li-
cense-limited access policy state.
The first constraint establishes the season length. Vessels trade quota so that the
fleet consolidates until the TAC is harvested in the longest season length that allows
completion of all integer-fishing activities (not including the pre- and post-season
activities) within TMAX days. This consolidation to the core fleet minimizes variable
operating costs and maximizes quasi rents. The second constraint defines the maxi-
mum number of pots, nV, that the operator fishes as less than or equal to the
regulatory pot limit, PotLimitV.4 The third constraint prevents fleet-wide catch from
exceeding the TAC. The last constraint limits catch per vessel in a rationalized fish-
ery to its quota holding. The third and fourth constraints together serve as the
market equilibrium condition that supply of quota equals demand.
Systematic, Non-Uniform Fishing Rotation
The abbreviated model in equation (1) is expanded primarily by delineating the sys-
tematic, non-uniform fishing rotation and then expressing CatchV  in terms of the
updated nonlinear CPUE function. The length of each rotation is a function of time-
dependent decision variables and the duration of the prior rotation.
The crab fishing process is assumed to begin in Dutch Harbor, Alaska, where
pre-season activities occur. Pre-season activities include stacking pots aboard the
vessel, up to the lesser of the VCCV or the regulatory pot limit. Vessels wishing to
fish more pots than their VCCV must haul gear to designated wet storage areas near
the fishing grounds before the season. These pots may be retrieved only after the
season commences.5 Immediately before the season, loaded vessels travel to the
fishing grounds, where they wait for the season to commence; i.e., when in-season
3 The last two constraints assure supply of quota equals demand. These constraints prevent vessels from
renting out their initial quota allocation at S and then acquiring all quota at (1 – γV)S. More importantly,
crew refuse to work for a payment equal to γV (P * CatchV – CVCV – S * CatchV). Vessels that deducted
the cost of quota on all quota, both their initial allocation and rented quota, lost their crew. The current
convention of treating the cost of rented quota like bait and fuel may change over time. A deduction on
all quota equal to the opportunity cost of capital, an amount considerably less than the crew share,
seems likely, especially after the first generation of quota recipients retires from the fishery. Achieving a
quota pricing equilibrium may take many years. The now 13-year-old North Pacific halibut IFQ program
still uses a crew-share deduction convention on quota.
4 In 2004, vessels less than or equal to 125 feet in length were allowed to fish 200 pots, whereas vessels
greater than 125 feet were allowed to fish 250 pots. Rationalization in 2005 increased the pot limit regu-
lation to a common 450 pots per vessel.
5 Elongated seasons due to rationalization also allow vessels to retrieve additional gear from onshore
storage, at or near the dock. This alternative is not modeled. The crab rationalization policy also allows
vessels to join fishing cooperatives that may share gear, which can alter the preseason decision to set
and retrieve additional gear from wet storage. This feature of fishing behavior cannot be included in this
model, possibly resulting in a slight overstatement of fishing costs.Processing Quota Impact on Crab Harvesters 259
fishing activities start. In-season activities involve the general fishing process of se-
quentially setting and picking pots. In its simplest form, the fishing process involves
setting a baited pot on the seabed and soaking it a unit of time (STV). The pot is then
picked from the seabed; legal male crabs are retained; and the pot is re-baited and
re-set or stacked on deck and moved to a new location, where it is re-baited and re-
set. This simplified pick/set cycle is repeated for all pots, one at a time, until season
closure. In reality, however, the optimal soak time and thus CPUE, depends upon
when in the season it is being measured, the ultimate season length, the number of
pots being fished, whether or not the pots that are soaking are influenced by a prior
delivery to a processor, and/or whether the vessel stopped actively fishing to allow a
period of sleep. Soak time and CPUE are dependent on what occurred in the prior
time period. Post-season activities involve delivering the final load of crab to a pro-
cessor, returning to the fishing grounds as many times as necessary to pick up all
gear, and unload it at onshore pot storage.
There are three distinct fishing periods within a season. Behavioral differences
stemming from the two management regimes are most easily contrasted by first de-
scribing the general crabbing process in the context of the license-limited fishery.
Period 1 consists of the initial unstacking/baiting/setting, picking/emptying/stack-
ing/running, and baiting/resetting all pots. Vessels that choose to fish pots in excess
of their vessel carrying capacity take an in-season trip from the fishing grounds to a wet
storage area in order to retrieve additional pots. These vessels first set all pots initially
carried to the grounds before retrieving additional pots. It is assumed that vessels set all
pots retrieved from wet storage before picking, re-baiting and re-setting the gear, and
that all pots are picked in the order that they were set. All pots soak a different amount
of time throughout Period 1. The soak time for the first pot that is set is determined by
the amount of time it takes to set all remaining pots in the first period, including any
time spent obtaining gear from wet storage. The initial soak time of any other pot is de-
termined by its exact position in the fishing sequence. Period 2 is characterized by a
constant per pot soak time; the pick-set process is repeated for all pots, possibly multiple
times. Anticipation of season closure may require vessels to rebait and reset only a sub-
set of the pots at the end of Period 2. The remaining pots are picked/emptied and reset
back on the seabed, unbaited, with doors open for post-season collection. The third and
last period under the race-for-fish consists only of the final pick of those pots that were
baited and set at the end of Period 2. Period 3 ends with all baited pots picked/emp-
tied and set back on the seabed, unbaited with doors open.6 Season compression to
just a few days when racing for fish means the crew works around the clock, without
sleep. Vessels simply cycle through gear until the season is closed by emergency or-
der. The first delivery of live crab to a processor occurs after season closure.
Quota trading under rationalization elongates the season, which adds three di-
mensions of systematic but non-uniform rotational complexity to the problem. First,
daily sleep becomes critical to crew safety. Based on conversations with industry
members, it is assumed the crew sleeps six hours per 24-hour day, regardless of ves-
sel size. Vessels stop working during this sleep period and “jog” in a low fuel
consumption mode. The work-sleep cycle impacts the optimal soak time, CPUE, and
number of pots fished in a particular day. It also requires that the total number of
pots fished be divided into an integer number of pots that are actively fished each
18-hour workday. The crew first sleeps after all pots have been set and a workday’s
complement of gear has been picked and reset. Thus, the first six-hour sleep occurs
6 This assumption simplifies the decision to stack a subset of the nV pots, which has vessel stability im-
plications, given full or partially full tanks of crab. All pots are picked, stacked, and returned to dry stor-
age after the final crab delivery of the season.Matulich 260
either in Period 1 if the integer number of days required to pick and reset all gear
exceeds 1; otherwise the first sleep begins Period 2.
A second consequence of elongated seasons is that vessels must leave the fish-
ing grounds, with their gear soaking, to make in-season deliveries of live crabs to a
processor. Fuel consumption rises but so does catch per unit of effort (CPUEV) due
to longer, delivery-influenced soak times.7 The first of potentially multiple deliver-
ies occurs in Period 2. The inclusion of in-season deliveries requires dividing Period
2 into two distinct sub-periods, each with different soak times and CPUEs. Period
2.1 is linked to Period 1 in that no in-season delivery has occurred. However, unlike
Period 1, all pots soak an identical amount of time in Period 2.1. The first in-season
delivery occurs at the beginning of Period 2.2. Soak times and thus, catch rates vary
across Period 2.2; some of the catch rates are delivery influenced, some are both de-
livery influenced and sleep influenced, and some are only sleep influenced. There
may be many repetitions of Period 2.2, depending on the class-specific, optimal sea-
son length. Period 3 always commences with the one and only in-season delivery
during that period. The final delivery is made after the end of Period 3; i.e., at the
beginning of post-season activities.
The third consequence of season elongation is that all pots are assumed to soak
a minimum of 12 hours prior to being picked. If 12 hours has not elapsed since the
first pot is set, the vessel must Wait in a jog mode.
Solution Procedure
The solution procedure is dictated by two considerations. First, the real-valued deci-
sion variables (STV, SLV, TV) are actually intermediate variables that are functions of
only integer variables, e.g., nV and mV. Thus, the optimization problem is de facto an in-
teger, nonlinear program. Second, some integer variables, like the optimal
vessel-specific number of pots, nV, are also unknown upper limits on associated index
sets {1, 2, …, nV}. The optimal numerical value of this integer is determined by the opti-
mization program. Accordingly, optimization programs, such as GAMS, were not used.
Instead, a complete enumeration algorithm was written in the C++ programming lan-
guage and run under a Windows operating system. The enumeration algorithm searches
among all feasible fishing strategies to maximize accumulated quasi rents, given that
harvesters trade quota so that the fewest, most efficient vessels harvest the TAC within
the maximum season length. The set of feasible fishing strategies is delimited by the















where DelV/24  is a real-valued parameter defining the number of days required to
deliver a load of live crab to the processor; and αT
V ∈ [kV, αV] is the integer number
of fishing days in the terminal period, exclusive of the initial and only delivery. The
terminal number of fishing days (αT
V) must equal or exceed the time to pick and set
all nV pots (i.e., is at least kV days long) and may not exceed the maximum number of
7 In reality, delivery frequency is dictated by catch rate, capacity of the live tanks, and weather condi-
tions. The decision to make in-season deliveries is simplified in this analysis because live tank capaci-
ties are unknown. In-season deliveries are assumed to occur every six days for vessels less than or equal
125 feet and every eight days for the two larger vessel size classes that have larger live tank capacities.Processing Quota Impact on Crab Harvesters 261
days before the last delivery must be made, αV days. Parameter definitions and val-
ues are given in Appendix 1 for the five vessel-length classes.
The optimization problem is solved in two steps. First, all feasible fishing strat-
egies for each vessel class and associated initial quota allocation are enumerated for
a given TMAX. Quasi rent-maximizing strategies among the finite feasible set are cho-
sen for each vessel class. Second, quota is traded according to the equilibrium
conditions specified in equation (2). The model is re-optimized with the upper-
bound season length tightened until the fleet structure resembles the 2005 fleet.
Analytical Framework
Assessing both the economic efficiency benefits of rationalization and the distribu-
tion of those benefits among the initial IFQ recipients requires simulating with- and
without-rationalization policy scenarios. The “without-rationalization” simulation
establishes the race-for-fish baseline against which the “with-rationalization” simu-
lation is contrasted.
The first step in measuring the net benefits to harvesters involves calibrating the
econometrically estimated CPUE function in the context of the race-for-fish optimi-
zation model. Simulation 1 models fleet behavior for the last year (2004) of
license-limited access management. In 2004, a fleet of 243 CVs plus eight CPs har-
vested 13,889,067 pounds of red king crab in just three days-eight hours. The CV
share of this catch was 95.7%. Only the CV portion of this fishery is modeled, as-
suming the CV fleet structure is identical to the actual 2004 fleet. Vessels less than
or equal to 125 feet in length were limited by regulation to fish at most 200 pots;
larger vessels were limited to 250 pots.
Model calibration followed Briand et al. (2004). The season- and day-specific
CPUE function parameters estimated by Briand, Matulich, and Mittelhammer (2001)
were compressed into an average CPUE function that conformed to the actual 2004
fishing conditions and regulations. Four benchmarks were used to calibrate the 2004
CPUE function: (i) actual catch by the CV fleet, (ii) actual catch by vessel class,
(iii) actual season length, and (iv) an estimate of CPUE that was developed by the
Alaska Department of Fish and Game from observers onboard a subset of the fleet.
The CPUE function parameters were adjusted to yield optimization model results
consistent with these four calibration benchmarks.
Ideally, this calibration model could serve as the without-rationalization bench-
mark for policy comparison. However, fleet structure changed between 2004 and
2005 policy implementation, as did the TAC and prices. Prior to initial quota alloca-
tion, 25 qualified CVs exited the fishery in a government-sponsored industry buyout
program. Some of the remaining vessels did not fish in 2004, and some that did fish
in 2004 did not qualify as quota recipients. Ultimately, 227 vessels were awarded
quota share (QS) based on their catch history during qualifying years. The QS is
converted annually to IFQ, once the TAC is set.
With- and without-policy analysis requires comparison across an identical initial
fleet structure in both policy contexts. The without-rationalization context is mod-
eled by overlaying the 2005 post-buyout, pre-trade fleet structure and initial QS
allocation on the race-for-fish calibration model. All prices, TAC, and fishery regu-
lations were fixed at the 2004 level. Thus, without-rationalization catch per vessel
equals the product of the post-buyout, pre-trade, initial QS allocation times the 2004
TAC; UQRs are pegged at the 2004 calibration level, yielding total quasi rents per
vessel that conform to the without scenario catch. This without-rationalization sce-
nario allows for meaningful comparison of gains and/or losses arising from
rationalization that is due solely to quota trading.Matulich 262
Several factors militated against modeling the with-rationalization policy sce-
nario as the 2005 season, per se. Quota trading among the CVs that received an
initial allocation reduced the fleet to 89 active vessels that participated in the first-
ever rationalized red king crab fishery. The 2005 season elongated to more than two
months, though this extensive season elongation misrepresents efficiency-driven be-
havioral changes that derive from quota trading. Few of the 89 vessels fished on any
given day during the 2005 season because of three predominant factors: (i) internal
decisions of 15 “operational” fishery cooperatives (not limited anti-trust exempt co-
operatives) that were encouraged to form under the rationalization policy, (ii) the
unprecedented high Pacific cod prices that diverted crab vessels into the concurrent
pot cod fishery, and (iii) dangerous weather conditions during some of the 2005 sea-
son. None of these factors could be modeled.
Accordingly, the with- and without-rationalization analysis is conducted in the
context of the 2004 simulated TAC and the 2004 prices. The analysis essentially
asks, What would have happened had the 2004 fishery been rationalized, given the
initial quota allocations and no opportunity to change ex-vessel price due to policy
design; i.e., no price influence of IPQs? See Appendix 1 for parameter values.
Consolidation of the post-buyout, 227-vessel CV fleet is allowed to accommo-
date a nearly 10-fold season length extension from the actual 3.3-day, 2004
license-limited access fishery to TMAX ≤ 30 days. This upper bound is then tightened
to maximize fleet-wide quasi rents for a fleet size similar to that in 2005. Addition-
ally, the pot limit is revised in accordance to regulation to at most 450 pots per
vessel, regardless of length. The with-rationalization analysis abstracts from certain
cost saving behavioral changes that undoubtedly followed from rationalizing the
fishery. Survey participants could only speculate about cost reductions like reducing
engine RPMs while running and fishing or tuning engines to conserve fuel.
Total policy net benefits are calculated as the difference between what is earned
under the rationalized fishery minus what is earned under the 2004 license-limited
access fishery that is normalized to reflect the 2005 pre-trade, post-buyback fleet
configuration. Following trade, acquisitive or active vessels benefit two ways. They
earn any efficiency differential between policy states on their initial quota alloca-
tion. On all purchased quota, active vessels also earn the efficiency differential
between their reservation price and the equilibrium quota price, plus an additional
return equal to the crew share times the equilibrium quota price. Thus, the annual
policy benefit to an efficient vessel is: (UQRR
V – UQRL
V)ωV + [(UQRR
V – S) + γVS]ω′ V,
ω′ V ≥ 0. The superscript R refers to the rationalized policy state, and the superscript L
refers to the license-limited policy state. The policy benefit to exiting vessels, exclu-
sive of opportunity costs in alternative use, is the differential between the quota
price and their license-limited access UQRs earned on their initial quota allocation:
(S – UQRL)ωV, ω′ V < 0. Any alternative use for the vessel, including any salvage
value, raises net benefits for exiters.
Results
Calibration
Calibrated model results reflecting the 2004 race-for-fish are given in table 1. The
calibrated optimization model deviated little from three of the four calibration
benchmarks. Simulated CV fleet catch (13.271 M lbs.) underestimated actual catch
(13.286 M lbs.) by only 0.11%, in a virtually identical season length (3.34 days
simulated versus 3.3 days actual). Total catch by vessel-length class deviated less
than 2.8% for each of the five length classes. Only the CPUE observer estimate andProcessing Quota Impact on Crab Harvesters 263
the simulated CPUE deviated much. The CPUE estimate from ADF&G observer
data was 4.5 crab per pot lift more than the simulated CPUE (23 versus 18.5 crab
per pot lift). This difference is not important for two reasons. First, observed crab
vessels tend to be larger than the fleet average so as to accommodate observer living
quarters. Larger vessels fish more pots with longer soak times and higher CPUEs.
Second, unlike the other three calibration benchmarks, CPUE is an ADF&G estimate
and not a certain parameter value. It is used in calibration only to assure the asymp-
totic catch parameter, β0, exceeds observed performance.
Fishery Performance With and Without Rationalization
A comparison of the 2004 simulated fishery without and with rationalization is
given in table 2. Although the rationalization policy was examined initially with
TMAX ≤ 30 days, the results reported here reflect a season length of only 13 days. A
30-day season would allow processed crab to enter the Japanese end-of-year gift
giving market, thereby maintaining the highest possible price. But a 30-day season
would also result in excessive consolidation vis-à-vis the actual fleet size. TMAX = 13
days captures the first full increment of differential efficiency, where both the TAC
and season length are binding for the most efficient vessel class.
Quota trading elongates the season four fold, resulting in fleet consolidation
from 227 post-buyout vessels to 72 vessels. Sixty-eight vessels from the most effi-
cient vessel class (110 to 125 feet) and four vessels from the next most efficient
class (126 to 139 feet) harvest the TAC. The equilibrium quota price falls in the
$2.46–$2.54 interval defined by the reservation prices of the most efficient inactive
vessels and the most efficient active vessels. The most efficient, active vessels
nearly triple their catch, while the four active vessels in the next most efficient cat-
egory more than double their catch. All other vessels rent out their quota to the 72
active vessels.
Table 1
2004 Calibrated Model Results for the Catcher-Vessel Fleet, Race-for-Fish Policy
Vessel-length Class (feet)
Fleet <100 100–109 110–125 126–139 >139
No. Vessels 243 69 57 62 30 25
Catch
Actual 13,286,318 2,762,450 3,069,158 3,786,459 1,979,158 1,689,073
Simulated 13,271,451 2,804,829 3,113,414 3,681,689 2,002,646 1,668,872








Assuming a quota price of $2.50 and without any of the inevitable benefit of re-
duced fuel consumption, the pure harvesting efficiency gains from rationalization
are estimated to be $9,159,822 per year—a total net benefit increase from
$32,708,643 to $41,868,465. Net benefits increase for every vessel class. Notice that
even the four marginal active vessels (126 to 139 feet) benefit substantially, despite
earning UQRs from fishing equal to four cents less than the price of quota. These ves-
sels earn $0.97 per pound (39% crew share times the quota cost) on all acquired quota.
All results are based on a simplifying and obviously false assumption that ratio-
nalization provides no opportunity to conserve fuel. Vessel owners that participated
in the cost of production survey prior to the first year of rationalization could only
speculate that fuel savings would be likely—they could not quantify the savings. A
Table 2
2004 Simulated Performance: Without Rationalization versus With Rationalization1
Per Vessel, by Length Class (feet)2
Fleet <100 100–109 110–125 126–139 >139
No. Vessels
2004 (actual) 243 69 57 62 30 25
Without 227 63 43 68 25 28





Calibrated 2004 13,271,451 40,650 54,621 59,382 66,755 66,755
Without (initial quota) 13,271,451 41,049 60,597 66,424 74,612 60,597
With 13,271,451 184,418 182,751
Quasi Rents ($)3
Without 32.709 M 97,449 148,594 168,738 185,215 145,544
With (total) 41.868 M
With (inactive) 21.138 M 102,621 151,494 186,530 151,494
With (active) 20.730 M 287,262 299,075
Unit Quasi Rents ($)
Without4 2.37 2.45 2.54 2.48 2.40
With (selling) 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50
With (initial quota) 2.54 2.46
With (royalty quota) 1.01 0.97
Quota Price ($/lb.) 2.46–2.54
Policy Net Benefits ($) 9.160 M
With (inactive) 5,172 2,900 1,315 5,950
With (active) 118,524 113,860
1 All dollars denominated “with-rationalization” results assume no gain in fuel efficiency.
2 All results reported by vessel class are per vessel, except the number of vessels.
3 All quasi rents and unit quasi rents are based on an assumed quota trade price of $2.50/lb.
4 UQRs under the without scenario were set equal to the calibrated UQRs for the 243-vessel fleet applied
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10% fuel savings would increase total net benefits less than $82,000 in total and
have no perceptible impact on the imputed quota price.
Rationalization benefits the crab fishery in additional ways than captured by
changes in quasi rents. Soak times, for example, increase from an average of 12–22
hrs. per pot under the without-rationalization scenario, to a minimum of 15–33 hrs.
per pot and a maximum of six days per pot, depending primarily upon whether the
pot is sleep and/or delivery influenced. Longer soak times translate into reduced
handling mortality and improved conservation. Rationalization also reduces the amount
of gear on the grounds by 71%, from 27,903 pots to 8,208 pots. At an assumed 1% pot
loss rate, this reduction in gear translates into additional conservation benefits from less
ghost fishing. No vessels pick up extra gear from wet storage; only the 126–139 foot
vessel class fishes sufficient gear to soak each pot a minimum of two days (except
for the first picks in Period 1). Perhaps most important though, is rationalization im-
proves crew safety. Not a single crew member died since policy implementation.
An additional with-rationalization simulation was conducted to evaluate the im-
plication that fleet consolidation might increase CPUE, given a constant TAC.
Average variable costs drop, and both unit and total quasi rents increase. The as-
ymptotic catch parameter, β0, was doubled from 27 to 54 crab per pot lift, and the
with-rationalization quota trading model was re-run. Equilibrium quota price in-
creases to $2.61 per pound. The fleet consolidates to just 53 active vessels in the
110–125 foot vessel class, while the season length drops from 13 to 10 days.
Discussion
The BSAI crab rationalization policy was designed for a variety of purposes, not the
least of which was to assure both harvesters and processors participated in the eco-
nomic benefits of rationalization. The Council was silent on the relative distribution
of those benefits. Some argued that the use of individual processing quota would
harm harvesters. The Council responded to these concerns by requiring early, peri-
odic reviews that focused on whether specific elements of the policy need to be
modified in order to assure both harvesters and processors participated in the policy
benefits. The analysis contained in this article addresses that goal from the harvest-
ing perspective, while abstracting from many of the detailed policy elements.
Additional, if not more important factors, like elimination of four to five deaths per
year, are not considered in this article.
The with- and without-policy analysis presented here isolates purely efficiency-
driven harvesting benefits from red king crab rationalization. Fleet-wide net benefits
exceed $9.2 million per year, and all vessel classes participate in those benefits. No
vessel class is damaged. Of equal importance, however, is the fact that the imputed
quota price of $2.46–$2.54 per pound is less than the empirical quota rental price.
Quota brokers and vessel owners reported that 2005 quota rented for 70% of the ex-
vessel price, after deducting 5.5% for fees and taxes. This rental or royalty rate
establishes the empirically based, equilibrium market price for quota of $3.11/
pound, based on a 2004 ex-vessel price of $4.70. It should be noted that actual roy-
alty rate includes any discount or premium harvesters applied because of IPQs. The
fact that harvesters actually paid 22% to 26% more for quota than supported purely
by the imputed efficiency gains affirms they were not damaged by IPQs. Had IPQs
disadvantaged harvesters, they would have paid less, not more than the imputed effi-
ciency value. This observation supports the conclusion that omitted policy elements,
like IPQs, skipper quota, and community protection, do not alter the finding that the
BSAI crab rationalization program benefits harvesters. Doubling the potential CPUE
under the rationalized policy state does not alter this conclusion.Matulich 266
There are several reasons why the empirical quota market exceeded efficiency-
based imputed prices:
1. Crab rationalization is new. Harvesters may not know how to value
quota. The high prices could reflect speculative behavior, though this
seems unlikely in an annual rental context. The fact that the quota royalty
rate softened to the 66–70% interval in 2006 might be partially attributed
to learning, though a 40% increase in the cost of fuel surely contributed
to the lower royalty rate. Regardless, the 2006–07 empirically based
quota price range still exceeds the imputed price by at least 15% to 19%.
2. The 10% asymmetry between IFQ and IPQ was intended to provide price
leverage to harvesters on the 10% open-delivery quota (B-shares).
Harvesters should be able to capture the joint quasi rents (the composite
contribution value from harvesting plus processing) on B-shares. In fact,
harvesters did capture higher ex-vessel prices on most open delivery
shares in 2005. The falling red king crab market during the 2006 season
makes such an unequivocal statement tenuous for that year.8 The
intended leverage raises the net benefits of the rationalization program,
thereby raising the equilibrium quota value, though it is impossible to
make a direct comparison of A-share and B-share prices because B-
shares could be used to raise the average (A+B)-share price.
3. The threat of binding arbitration and the associated nonbinding formula
price that is prepared prior to the season may have increased the share of
wholesale price paid to harvesters above the target historical level.9 This
possibility tends to lessen the difference between A- and B-share prices
but raise the overall premium on A-share quota.
4. Vessel class-specific, representative firm analysis may understate net
benefits in the acquisitive vessel class/classes. This would occur if the
survey participants in that class were less efficient than the true class
average.
Perhaps the most important limitation of this analysis concerns the representa-
tive firm approach. A typical vessel in each of five vessel-length classes
approximates heterogeneity across a fleet that ranges in length from under 70 feet to
more than 170 feet. Obviously, heterogeneity exists within each of the five length
intervals. This is one reason the post-trade simulated fleet does not mirror the cur-
rently active fleet. Another reason is that the decision to buy, hold, or sell quota is
dependent on a variety of factors, including efficiencies in other activities, espe-
cially the winter opilio crab fishery and age of the quota recipient. While the
110–125 foot vessel class is estimated to be most efficient in the rationalized red
king crab fishery, it may not be as efficient as the 126–139 foot vessel class is in
bigger seas of the more dangerous winter opilio fishery. The small efficiency differ-
8 Vessels that made open deliveries late in the 2006 season and without forward contracts assumed all
price risk. Open delivery (B-share) prices established at the end of the season were often less than A-
share prices on deliveries that had to be made to a processor holding IPQ. Simple comparison of A-share
and B-share prices is not an indicator of price leverage.
9 John Sackton, the individual who prepares the binding arbitration pre-season price formula and market
report, acknowledged this point during his testimony to the NPFMC’s 18-month review, April 2007
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ential between these two classes might be reversed and overshadowed by the rela-
tive efficiencies in the opilio fishery.
It is clear that the BSAI crab rationalization program did not damage harvesters,
in either an absolute or relative distribution sense. In fact, the contrary is implied by
the empirical royalty payment in excess of estimated harvesting efficiency benefits.
Harvesters either captured more than their pure efficiency gain; i.e., the harvesters’
share of composite quasi rents increased relative to the processors’ share, or harvest-
ers are behaving in an irrational manner. Irrational behavior seems an unlikely
explanation for renting quota above the efficiency value since the actual quota roy-
alty has persisted at 66–70% of the ex-vessel price (net of fees and taxes) for three
seasons.
The net per pound efficiency benefit plus the $0.57–$0.61 premium above the
efficiency-based quota price implies an annual net benefit of $16.7–$17.3 million.
The capitalized value of this annual net benefit to vessel owners, assuming a 35-year
horizon and 2.25% real interest rate (Federal Reserve Board of San Francisco 2005),
is $399–$415 million. This capitalized value excludes both the additional net ben-
efits to catcher-processors and from the improved Bristol Bay red king crab stock
abundance that was, in part, an expected by-product of rationalization.10
The empirical quota market corroborates the numerical results of this study.
Brokers report red king crab quota sells at roughly a seven-fold multiple of the gross
ex-vessel value. At the 2004 TAC and ex-vessel price, post-rationalization market
valuation is $436 million. The relatively small premium above the capitalized net
benefit estimate of $399–$415 million suggests the fleet was teetering on the brink
of financial ruin prior to rationalization.
The conclusion that harvesters were made better off from a crab rationalization
policy design that included IPQs should not be surprising; the BSAI crab policy was
designed to maintain contestable markets. Nor should one be surprised by the rheto-
ric surrounding crab rationalization, when so few firms stand to gain so much from
political redistribution of wealth. The Council’s admonition that it would conduct
early and periodic program reviews and fix unintended consequences—in particular,
demonstrable damage to harvesters, processors, or fishery-dependent coastal com-
munities (Duffy 2002; North Pacific Fisheries Management Council
2002)—unfortunately served to encourage rent seeking. Separating fact from rent
seeking remains the Council’s greatest challenge.
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Appendix
Parameter Definitions and Values
Appendix Table 1.1
Pre- and Post-buyout Fleet Structure and Initial Quota
Share (QS) Allocation, by Vessel-length Class
Parameter Values by Vessel-length Class (Feet)
Parameter Definition <100 100–109 110–125 126–139 >139
License-limited access
(243 vessels)
V # of vessels 69 57 62 30 25
   per class
Post-buyout pre-trade
(227 vessels)
V # of vessels 63 43 68 25 28
   per class
ω Original quota 0.003093 0.004566 0.005005 0.0056222 0.004566
   share/vessel1
1 Initial per-vessel quota share allocation reported as CV portion of the TAC equals 100%.Matulich 270
Appendix Table 1.2
Parameter Definitions and Values for Vessel-specific Characteristics and Activities
Parameter Values by Vessel-length Classes (feet)
Parameter Definition <100 100–109 110–125 126–139 >139
VCCV Vessel carrying capacity
   (7’x7’x3’ pots) 75 126 135 218 215
CrewV Number of crew 5 6 6 6 7
γV Crew share 43% 41.5% 39% 40.5% 42%
SleepV Min. sleep time race/
   rationalized (hrs.) 0 / 6 0 / 6 0 / 6 0 / 6 0 / 6
RunFuelV Fuel while running (gph.) 22 29 42 45 48
JogFuelV Fuel while jogging (gph.) 7 15 23 23 24
FishFuelV Fuel while fishing (gph.) 16 23 32 33 35
DockFuelV Fuel while at dock (gph.) 3 6 10 11 11
DFuelV
1 Fuel while delivering (gph.) 18 23 33 34 36
Pre-season Activities
LoadV Stack pots from shore
   (min./pot) 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 2.8
WetTrip Round trip to wet storage
   (hrs.) 20 20 20 20 20
WetSet Set gear in wet storage
   (min./pot) 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
RunGrnds First run time one way to
   grounds with gear (hrs.) 18 18 18 18 18
In-season Activities
IntTrip Round trip grounds to wet
   storage (hrs.) 13 13 13 13 13
RetrV Wet storage pot retrieval
   (min./pot) 3 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4
PickV Pick-empty time (min./pot) 3.7 3.5 3 3 3
SetV Stack-run-bait-set (min./pot) 8.3 7.5 7.0 7.0 7.0
DelV Round trip delivery + dock
   time (hrs.) 47 48 50 53 53
Post-season Activities
RunGrnds One way run grounds to
dock (hrs.) 18.0 18.0 18.0 18.0 18.0
PickStack Pick and stack gear
(min./pot) 6 6 6 6 6
Unload Unload/store onshore
(min./pot) 3 3 3 3 3
1 Weighted average fuel consumption while running and at dock.Processing Quota Impact on Crab Harvesters 271
Appendix Table 1.3
Common Parameters, Definitions, and Values
Parameter
Parameter Definition Value
TAC Total allowable catch (M lbs.) 13.826
Tmax Maximum season length (days)
License-limited access N/A
Rationalized ≤ 30
β0 CPUE asymptote 27
β2 CPUE pot fill rate –1.6
P Crab price before fees and taxes ($/lb.) $4.70
BaitPrice Bait price ($ per pot) $10
Regist Pot registration fee ($/pot) $2
PotPrice Pot + buoy + line cost ($/pot) $850
FuelPrice Fuel price ($/gal.) $1.50
PctLoss Percent of pots lost 1.0%
Imaint Pot maintenance cost ($/pot) $20
PctMaint Percent of pots maintained 100%
DailyCost Food ($25) + P&I Insurance ($60) per crewday $85